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Holder assails policing for profit
Attorney general's initiative curbs but does not eliminate controversial asset
seizure policies
January 22, 2015 2:00AM ET

by Lauren Carasik @LCarasik

On Jan. 16, outgoing U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced sweeping
revisions to the federal civil asset forfeiture policy, barring state and local police
from using federal law to confiscate cash and other property. Under the oftcriticized equitable sharing program, the federal government “adopts” assets
seized by state and local law enforcement and then funnels up to 80 percent of
the value back to the agencies.
The program invited malfeasance by giving cash-strapped police departments
incentive to confiscate property believed to be involved in illicit activities even
when the owners were not accused — much less convicted — of any crime. The
program’s abuses have garnered bipartisan support for reform, and critics are
praising Holder’s changes.
While the improvements are laudable, they will not end the abuse for a number of
reasons. First, local agencies may continue the programs under state laws.
Second, Holder did not ban forfeiture for state and federal joint operations. And
finally, the changes fall short of addressing the how civil forfeiture tramples due
process rights.

Perverse incentives
Initially crafted as a tool for use in admiralty, customs and confiscation of pirate
bounty, civil forfeiture has been around for centuries. It is distinct from its criminal
analog, in which assets are seized only after a defendant has been convicted of
wrongdoing. The practice was reinvigorated in 1985 for use in the drug war,
intended to deplete illegal profits amassed by gangs and cartels and provide
funds for law enforcement efforts. Instead, civil forfeiture has evolved into a

program that often targets the innocent and is driven by profiteering instead of
justice.
It has provided a windfall to police departments. Last year a Washington
Post investigation revealed disturbing statistics: More than $2.5 billion in cash
was confiscated since 9/11 in nearly 62,000 seizures. State and local law
enforcement agencies kept $1.7 billion. None of the owners from whom the
property was confiscated were convicted of a crime. Although civil seizures are
authorized under state and federal law, in some cases the federal reimbursement
allowance exceeded the amount agencies were permitted to retain under state
restrictions.
The standards for confiscating property were often lower under federal law than
what states were required to prove. As a result, participation in the program
enabled local law enforcement agencies to circumvent state safeguards against
overzealous policing and protections for property owners.

Allowing law enforcement agencies to profit directly from the
seizure of assets has encouraged aggressive, self-interested
policing and caused irreparable harm to many innocent people.
The federal law prohibits the use of funds for salaries, but limitations on the use
of confiscated assets are often lax and poorly monitored under state law. Some
departments have used the confiscated funds to pay for salaries, bonuses,
equipment and other items deemed useful for their units, including a Zamboni,
luxury cars, military grade equipment and a margarita machine. Hundreds of
police departments relied on forfeitures to fund at least 20 percent of their
operating budgets, according to the Washington Post.
Illustrating officers’ compromised motives, a leaked training seminar tape for law
enforcement agencies showed instructors disclosing tips about how to maximize
the profitability and ease of the seizures. And the focus on confiscation played
out in the field. For example, aggrieved motorists in presumed drug corridors

are often pulled over for minor infractions and subjected to shakedowns. The
“probable cause” justifying the seizure of cash was often flimsy and
manufactured, such as presuming that anyone carrying large amounts of cash is
inherently suspect while ignoring the owners’ verifiable explanations.
The forfeiture process is premised on a quirky legal fiction in which suit is filed
against the property itself. Those seeking the return of their property can assert
their innocence, but in most cases they bear the burden of proof. In the Post’s
investigation, property owners challenged the seizures in fewer than 20 percent
of cases, though states agreed to return the money in more than 40 percent of
those challenges. Property owners abandon their assets for a variety of reasons.
The cost of recovery may exceed the value of the items seized, litigating in a
state they were merely traveling may be too difficult, and they may fear further
involvement with law enforcement. Because the matter is not criminal, owners
are not entitled to free legal assistance and must often pay substantial fees just
to initiate claims. It can take months or even years for cases to be processed.
And even for owners who succeed in obtaining the full or partial return of their
assets, the temporary unavailability of their money can cause irreparable
damage.
It is hardly surprising that civil forfeiture has a disproportionate effect on
minorities. In the 400 court cases the Post examined in which at least some
money was returned to owners, the majority were black, Latino or from another
minority group. A 2014 ProPublica report echoed a similar racial bias,
documenting that the majority of owners seeking the return of their homes
confiscated in Philadelphia were from poor and minority communities. In some
cases, those dispossessed of their property were never even suspects. Some of
the homes were seized because the owners’ children or grandchildren committed
minor drug offenses, often without their elders’ knowledge.
To be fair, civil forfeiture has positive aspects: It has provided hundreds of
millions of dollars for restitution to crime victims and funneled illicit funds away
from organized crime (though large enterprises are rarely the target of state and

local efforts). And few would disagree that convicted criminals should not be able
to keep ill-gotten gains.
But allowing law enforcement agencies to profit directly from the seizure of
assets has encouraged aggressive, self-interested policing and caused
irreparable harm to many innocent people. Holder’s new policy must be bolstered
by additional safeguards at the state level, including closer oversight, greater
protections for owners and eliminating incentives by channeling seized funds into
the state’s general coffers or other departments. But even those reforms fail to
remedy the concern about the fundamental fairness of confiscating property in
the absence of a criminal conviction, especially given civil forfeiture’s disparate
effect on minorities and the poor.
Lauren Carasik is a clinical professor of law and the director of the international human rights clinic at the Western
New England University School of Law.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera America's editorial
policy.

